

# Optimal Strategies and Tactical Decisions for Army Brigades

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$$\begin{cases} \frac{dx}{dt} = u - \alpha(\text{Depth}, \text{FWA}, \text{FWP})y \\ \frac{dy}{dt} = v - \beta(\text{Depth}, \text{FWA}, \text{FWP})x \end{cases}$$

# Summary

This presentation shows new methods for optimizing delay operations with brigades.

The objective function takes into account all the costs of the war and its consequences.

Part 1: In advance, at the strategic level: Determination of the optimal depth of defense, the optimal initial number of soldiers, the optimal investments in fieldworks for defense, as well as fieldworks for attacks.

Part 2: Gradually, at the tactical level: Determination of how the different battalions should allocate their total capacity, i.e., the use of time and thus also other resources.

The optimal strategic and tactical decisions are influenced by the prices of various resources and measures. Examples of how different strategic and tactical decisions are affected by various conditions are presented.

References <https://www.lohmander.com/Information/Ref.htm>

# Optimal Strategies and Tactical Decisions for Army Brigades

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## Abstract

Strategies and tactical decisions, of an army brigade, are optimized. The objective function is based on all costs of the preparations and of the war. In the first section, the optimal depth of defense, Depth, is determined. Simultaneously, the optimal levels of field work for attack, FWA, and for protection, FWP, are derived. FWA includes defense preparations with vehicle mines, antipersonnel mines, destruction of bridges and preparations of assaults and counter attacks. Construction of fortifications and tunnels are parts of FWP. The optimal initial number of defending soldiers,  $x_0$ , is simultaneously calculated. A differential equation system model of an extended Lanchester type is constructed and solved, with attrition parameters that are functions of Depth, FWA and FWP. The differential equation system model is used as a sub routine in a new defense optimization model. The time before the war ends,  $T$ , and the number of unharmed defending soldiers,  $x_T$ , are simultaneously determined as functions of the parameters and optimal decisions. The optimal objective function value is a decreasing function of the price of the land and of the price of the soldiers. In optimum: Depth and  $x_0$  are decreasing functions of the respective prices; FWP is an increasing function of the prices of land and soldiers, and FWA is an increasing function of the price of land. In the second section, the activities within the defending brigade, BLUE, and the attacking force, RED, are analyzed in detail. Artillery battalions, mechanized battalions and cavalry ranger battalions cooperate with each other and with other kinds of units. A controlled discrete time nonlinear difference equation system in six dimensions is constructed and numerically solved. This model system represents the war that takes place within the area defended by the BLUE brigade. The model describes the dynamic developments of the BLUE and RED resources. The model optimizes the degree of cooperation and selection of targets by different kinds of battalions. The attrition levels are nonlinear functions of the amounts of time that different kinds of battalions spend in different ways in this cooperation. For instance, a cavalry ranger battalion may search and find targets for an artillery battalion, and/or attack enemy cavalry units or other enemies. Each battalion has limited total time available. The model is used to derive the dynamic development of the resources of BLUE and RED under different parameter assumptions, representing dynamic unit deployments and other conditions. The model can with marginal adjustments also be used to determine the dynamic game outcomes when BLUE and RED sequentially adapt the decisions to the changes made by the other sides. As an illustration, the optimal use of cavalry ranger battalion time as a function of the cost per unit of the remaining enemy artillery battalions at a future point in time, is determined.

## Keywords

Military optimization, strategy, tactics, coordination, army, brigade, battalion.

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## Connected articles:

Lohmander, P. (2017). Applications and Mathematical Modeling in Operations Research, In: Cao BY. (ed) Fuzzy Information and Engineering and Decision. IWDS 2016. ***Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing***, vol 646. Springer, Cham, 2018 Print ISBN 978-3-319 66513-9, Online ISBN 978-3-319-66514-6, Pages 46-53, eBook Package: Engineering, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66514-6\\_5](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66514-6_5)

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**Mechanized battalion**




**Artillery battalion**




**Ranger battalion**

# A Brigade Defense Area



## Part 1:

# Optimization of the depth of defense, **Depth**.



Simultaneously, the optimal levels of field work for attack, **FWA**, and protection, **FWP**, are determined.



← **FWA**

**FWP** →



Simultaneously, the optimal initial number of defending soldiers,  $x_0$ , is also determined.

$x_0$  →



**A differential equation system model of extended Lanchester type is constructed and solved,**

**with attrition coefficients that are functions of Depth, FWA and FWP.**

**The differential equation system model is used as a sub routine in a new defense optimization model.**

# The Classical Lanchester Model

Time derivative of the size of the defending force →

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \frac{dx}{dt} = -\alpha y \\ \frac{dy}{dt} = -\beta x \end{array} \right.$$

← Size of the attacking force

↑ Attrition coefficients

→ Time derivative of the size of the attacking force

← Size of the defending force

# The Extended Lanchester Model

Reinforcements per time unit of the defending force

Time derivative of the size of the defending force

$$\frac{dx}{dt}$$

$$= u - \alpha y$$

Size of the attacking force

Attrition coefficients

Time derivative of the size of the attacking force

$$\frac{dy}{dt}$$

$$= v - \beta x$$

Size of the defending force


Reinforcements per time unit of the attacking force

***The Extended Lanchester Model  
with attrition coefficients that  
are functions of decision variables.***

$$\begin{cases} \frac{dx}{dt} = u - \alpha(\text{Depth}, \text{FWA}, \text{FWP})y \\ \frac{dy}{dt} = v - \beta(\text{Depth}, \text{FWA}, \text{FWP})x \end{cases}$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \frac{dx}{dt} = u - \alpha y \\ \frac{dy}{dt} = v - \beta x \end{array} \right. \quad \begin{array}{l} (1a) \\ (1b) \end{array}$$

## The Extended Lanchester Model



The time path of  
 $(x(t), y(t))$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} x(t) = A_1 e^{\lambda t} + A_2 e^{-\lambda t} + \frac{v}{\beta} \\ y(t) = -\frac{\lambda}{\alpha} A_1 e^{\lambda t} + \frac{\lambda}{\alpha} A_2 e^{-\lambda t} + \frac{u}{\alpha} \\ \lambda = \sqrt{\alpha\beta} \end{array} \right.$$

With the initial conditions,  $(x(0), y(0)) = (x_0, y_0)$ , we may determine  $(A_1, A_2)$  from this linear 2x2 equation system.

$$\begin{bmatrix} e^{\lambda t} & e^{-\lambda t} \\ -\frac{\sqrt{\beta}}{\sqrt{\alpha}} e^{\lambda t} & \frac{\sqrt{\beta}}{\sqrt{\alpha}} e^{-\lambda t} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} A_1 \\ A_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} x(t) - \frac{v}{\beta} \\ y(t) - \frac{u}{\alpha} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$A_1 = \frac{\begin{vmatrix} x(0) - \frac{v}{\beta} & 1 \\ y(0) - \frac{u}{\alpha} & \frac{\sqrt{\beta}}{\sqrt{\alpha}} \end{vmatrix}}{\begin{vmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ -\frac{\sqrt{\beta}}{\sqrt{\alpha}} & \frac{\sqrt{\beta}}{\sqrt{\alpha}} \end{vmatrix}} = \frac{\left(x(0) - \frac{v}{\beta}\right) \frac{\sqrt{\beta}}{\sqrt{\alpha}} - y(0) + \frac{u}{\alpha}}{2 \frac{\sqrt{\beta}}{\sqrt{\alpha}}}$$

$$A_2 = \frac{\begin{vmatrix} 1 & x(0) - \frac{v}{\beta} \\ -\frac{\sqrt{\beta}}{\sqrt{\alpha}} & y(0) - \frac{u}{\alpha} \end{vmatrix}}{\begin{vmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ -\frac{\sqrt{\beta}}{\sqrt{\alpha}} & \frac{\sqrt{\beta}}{\sqrt{\alpha}} \end{vmatrix}} = \frac{y(0) - \frac{u}{\alpha} + \frac{\sqrt{\beta}}{\sqrt{\alpha}} \left(x(0) - \frac{v}{\beta}\right)}{2 \frac{\sqrt{\beta}}{\sqrt{\alpha}}}$$


$x(t)$  and  $y(t)$  are functions of  $A_1$ ,  $A_2$  and more.


The parameters  $A_1$  and  $A_2$  are functions of the parameters of the Extended Lanchester differential equation system and of the initial conditions  $(x(0), y(0)) = (X_0, Y_0)$

Furthermore, the parameters of the Extended Lanchester differential equation system are functions of several decision variables.

(Depth, FWA, FWP)


**Alternative versions of the  
Battle of Iwo Jima, 1945:**





**Numbers from the Battle of Iwo Jima, 1945:**

**0.05347**



$$\begin{cases} \cdot \\ x = -ay \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{cases} \cdot \\ y = -bx \end{cases}$$



**0.01045**

**Source:**

Lohmander, P., Attrition coefficient estimations via differential equation systems, initial and terminal conditions, and nonlinear iterative equation system solutions, Journal of Statistics and Computer Science, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 2024, pp. 51-78.

<https://www.arfjournals.com/jscs/issue/322>

[https://www.arfjournals.com/image/catalog/Journals%20Papers/JSCS/2024/No%201%20\(2024\)/ART\\_4.pdf](https://www.arfjournals.com/image/catalog/Journals%20Papers/JSCS/2024/No%201%20(2024)/ART_4.pdf)

The attrition coefficients are functions of Depth, FWP and FWA.




(Functions of these types can and should be determined with local empirical data.)

$$\alpha = \alpha_a * (50 / \text{Depth}) * (1 - .3 * \text{FWP} ^ .5)$$

 *constant*       *decreases with Depth*       *decreases with FWP*

*constant*      *increases with Depth*      *increases with FWA*

$$\beta = \beta_a * (\text{Depth} / 50) * (1 + .3 * \text{FWA} ^ .5)$$

## Master Decision Optimization Problem:

$$\max_{Depth, FWA, FWP, x_0} \phi(\bullet; P_{Depth}, P_{FWA}, P_{FWP}, P_{x_0}, \dots)$$

### Sub Routine:

All results of the conflict are calculated, based on the Extended Lanchester differential equation system, all parameters, and decision variables.

### Answers sent to the Master Decision Optimization Problem:

Will  $x(t)$  or  $y(t)$  reach size zero first? What is then the value of  $t$ , called  $T$ ?

What will be the size of the force that does not reach zero?

What are the costs of different used and lost resources etc.

## Example of Objective function in the Master Problem:

Objective =



$$\begin{aligned} & - P\_Depth * Depth \\ & - P\_x0 * x0 \\ & - .0002 * x0 * x0 \\ & - 1 * u * T \\ & - 170 * FWP - 170 * FWA \\ & + \text{Exp}(-r * T) * (xT - yT) \\ & - 10000 * ywins \end{aligned}$$

*Decision variables that the defending nation can control.*



*Decision variables that a coalition can control.*

## Optimal decisions:

**Opt\_Depth** and **Opt\_x0** are decreasing functions of the respective prices.





**Opt\_FWP** is an increasing function of the prices for land and soldiers.





**Opt\_FWA** är is an increasing function of the price of land.



**T, the time when the war ends, (when x or y is zero) is determined as a function of the parameters and the optimal decisions.**





The number of unharmed defending soldiers, when the war ends,  $x_T$ , is a *function of the parameters and the optimal decisions.*



The optimal objective function value, **Opt\_Obj**, is a decreasing function of the prices of land and soldiers.



The optimal value of the attrition coefficient that shows how rapidly the size of the defending force is reduced, Alpha, is a decreasing function of the prices of land and soldiers.



The optimal value of the attrition coefficient that shows how rapidly the size of the attacking force is reduced, Beta, is a decreasing function of the price of land.

## Observations:


Left Graph:

Assume that P\_Depth = 50.

(P\_x0 = 1, which is not seen the the graph).

Alpha = 0.88% and Beta = 5.35%


Then, a defending soldier deletes 6.08 attacking soldiers when one attacking soldier deletes one defending soldier. Compare the attack by USA on Iwo Jima during WW II. See the differential equation system to the right. Then, the situation was almost the same.




Lohmander, P. (2024). Attrition coefficient estimations via differential equation systems, initial and terminal conditions, and nonlinear iterative equation system solutions, *Journal of Statistics and Computer Science*, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 2024, pages 51-78. Publisher: ARF India.  
[https://www.arfjournals.com/image/catalog/Journals%20Papers/JSCS/2024/No%201%20\(2024\)/ART\\_4.pdf](https://www.arfjournals.com/image/catalog/Journals%20Papers/JSCS/2024/No%201%20(2024)/ART_4.pdf)


The diagram shows a system of differential equations:  $\begin{cases} \dot{x} = -ay \\ \dot{y} = -bx \end{cases}$ . A red arrow points down from the value 0.05347 to the coefficient 'a' in the first equation. A blue arrow points up from the value 0.01045 to the coefficient 'b' in the second equation.


# Brigades and dynamic cooperation between battalions




# Alternative situation











## Part 2:

The activities within the defending **Blue** and the attacking **Red** Brigades are analyzed in detail.



**Artillery battalions, mechanized battalions and ranger battalions cooperate with each other.**



**A controlled discrete time nonlinear difference equation system in six dimensions is constructed and numerically solved.**

$$dX_A(t) = jX_A(t) - \phi_{X_A}(v_{AA}, v_{CA}, Y_A, Y_C) \quad (44)$$

$$dX_C(t) = jX_C(t) - \phi_{X_C}(v_{AC}, v_{CC}, Y_A, Y_C) \quad (45)$$

$$dX_M(t) = jX_M(t) - \phi_{X_M}(v_{AM}, v_{CM}, v_{MM}, Y_A, Y_C, Y_M) \quad (46)$$

$$dY_A(t) = jY_A(t) - \phi_{Y_A}(u_{AA}, u_{CA}, X_A, X_C) \quad (47)$$

$$dY_C(t) = jY_C(t) - \phi_{Y_C}(u_{AC}, u_{CC}, X_A, X_C) \quad (48)$$

$$dY_M(t) = jY_M(t) - \phi_{Y_M}(u_{AM}, u_{CM}, u_{MM}, X_A, X_C, X_M) \quad (49)$$

**This model represents the part of the war that occurs within the area defended by the **Blue** Brigade.**

**The model describes the dynamic developments of the **Blue** and **Red** resources.**

**The model optimizes the degree of cooperation and selection of targets for different types of battalions.**

**The attrition levels are nonlinear functions of the time that different types of battalions spend in different ways in this cooperation.**

**For instance, a Blue ranger battalion can search and find targets for a Blue artillery battalion and/or attack Red rangers or other Red units.**

**Every battalion has limited total time available.**

**For example: A Blue ranger battalion can search and find targets for a Blue artillery battalion.**



**A Blue ranger battalion can attack Red forces.**



**A Blue ranger battalion can destroy Red tanks.**



**A Blue ranger  
battalion can  
destroy a bridge.**



**A Blue ranger  
battalion can  
use drones  
to destroy Red  
fuel deliveries.**



***Possible extension:***

**With marginal adjustments, the model can be used to determine the outcomes and the optimal decisions if Blue and Red dynamically adjust the decisions.**

## Illustration:

The optimal use of time of a **Blue** Ranger battalion, as a function of the cost per unit of the remaining **Red** artillery battalions at a future point in time,  $T$ .

Examples of objective functions

*Red Artillery battalions*

*Red Cavalry Rangers battalions*

*Red Mechanized battalions*

$$W_1 = f_{Y_A} Y_A(T) + f_{Y_C} Y_C(T) + f_{Y_M} Y_M(T) \quad (60)$$

$$(f_{Y_A}, f_{Y_C}, f_{Y_M}) = (-10, -5, -10) \quad (61)$$

This "cost per unit" will be adjusted.

Cost (for Blue) per unit of Red Artillery battalion at time T.

Optimal share of time of the Blue Ranger battalion, to fight Red Cavalry Rangers.

**Table 1.**

Parameter  $fYa = -15$

Optimal Solution:

objective function = -1085.318

uca	ucc	ucm
0.75	0.03	0.22

	Art	Cav	Mec
X(topt) =	9.557317	12.77866	40.5522
Y(topt) =	9.670883	29.32049	79.3652

Optimal share of time of the Blue Ranger battalion, to fight Red Mechanized units.

Optimal share of time of the Blue Ranger battalion, to search for targets for the Blue artillery battalion to fight Red artillery.

Estimated remaining number of Red artillery Battalions at time T.

**Table 2.**

Parameter  $fYa = -10$

Optimal Solution:

objective function = -1031.586

	uca	ucc	ucm	
	0.60	0.06	0.34	
		Art	Cav	Mec
X(topt) =		9.185617	12.59281	40.33058
Y(topt) =		12.17004	28.23752	76.86983

Cost (for Blue) per unit of Red Artillery battalion at time T.

Optimal share of time of the Blue Ranger battalion, to search for targets for the Blue artillery battalion to fight Red artillery.

Estimated remaining number of Red artillery Battalions at time T.

**Table 3.**


Parameter  $fYa = -5$

Optimal Solution:


objective function = -959.2858

	uca	ucc	ucm	
	0.32	0.11	0.57	
		Art	Cav	Mec
X(topt) =	8.382638	12.19132	39.83494	
Y(topt) =	17.75569	26.98911	73.55618	

Cost (for Blue) per unit of Red Artillery battalion at time T.



Optimal share of time of the Blue Ranger battalion, to search for targets for the Blue artillery battalion to fight Red artillery.



Estimated remaining number of Red artillery Battalions at time T.



## Observations:

If it becomes more important for the Blue brigade to reduce the number of Red artillery battalions at time  $T = 100$ , ( $f_{Ya}$  goes from -5 to -15) ,

Then,

The Blue rangers should increase the relative time spent on searching for Red artillery locations, to be reported to the Blue artillery.

$f_{Ya}$	Optimal share of time	Red artillery Battalions at time T
-5	32%	18
-10	60%	12
-15	75%	10

# Conclusions:

**It is possible to optimize delay operations with army brigades.**

**All costs of the war and the consequences may be considered.**

**In advance, at the strategic level, we should determine the optimal depth of defense, the optimal initial number of soldiers, and optimal investments in field works for defense and attack**

**Over time, at the tactical level, we should optimize the use of time (capacity) of the different battalions.**

**The optimal strategic and tactical decisions are strongly affected by changes of prices for different kinds of resources and activities.**

**Examples of how optimal decisions are affected by prices and costs of different kinds have been given.**



# ***Connected presentations in Swedish:***

**Lohmander, P., Optimal Fördröjningsstrid med Brigad, Kamratforeningen Blå Dragoner, Umeå Skvadron, 260416,**

**[http://www.Lohmander.com/PL\\_K4\\_Brigad\\_26.pdf](http://www.Lohmander.com/PL_K4_Brigad_26.pdf)**

**[http://www.Lohmander.com/PL\\_K4\\_Brigad\\_26.pptx](http://www.Lohmander.com/PL_K4_Brigad_26.pptx)**

**Lohmander, P., Optimal Krigföring via Tullar, Kamratforeningen Blå Dragoner, Umeå Skvadron, 251127,**

**[http://www.lohmander.com/PL\\_K4\\_Tullar\\_25.pdf](http://www.lohmander.com/PL_K4_Tullar_25.pdf)**

**[http://www.lohmander.com/PL\\_K4\\_Tullar\\_25.pptx](http://www.lohmander.com/PL_K4_Tullar_25.pptx)**

**Lohmander, P., Optimal Utnötning, från Iwo Jima till Ukraina och Framtiden, Kamratforeningen Blå Dragoner, Umeå Skvadron, 250327,**

**[http://www.lohmander.com/PL\\_K4\\_25.pdf](http://www.lohmander.com/PL_K4_25.pdf)**

**[http://www.lohmander.com/PL\\_K4\\_25.pptx](http://www.lohmander.com/PL_K4_25.pptx)**

**Lohmander, P., Optimal Jägarstrid, Kamratforeningen Blå Dragoner, Umeå Skvadron, Garnisonsmässen, Umeå, Sverige, Torsdagen den 18 April, 2024.**

**[http://www.Lohmander.com/PL\\_Optimal\\_Jagarstrid\\_240418.pdf](http://www.Lohmander.com/PL_Optimal_Jagarstrid_240418.pdf)**

**[http://www.Lohmander.com/PL\\_Optimal\\_Jagarstrid\\_240418.pptx](http://www.Lohmander.com/PL_Optimal_Jagarstrid_240418.pptx)**

**References:**

**<https://www.lohmander.com/Information/Ref.htm>**



***Thank you for your time!***

***Questions?***



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